Reserved Authority and Indirect Control: Yesterday’s NLRB Decision Establishes New Joint Employer Standard and Threatens Contract Employment
The National Labor Relations Board issued a landmark decision yesterday, reversing its precedent and establishing a new standard for determining when entities can be considered “joint employers” under the National Labor Relations Act. The 3-2 decision in Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. held that Browning-Ferris, the owner
and operator of a recycling facility, was a joint employer with its contractor, who provided workers (sorters, screen cleaners and housekeepers) to Browning-Ferris through a temporary labor services agreement. In its decision, the Board departed from its prior joint employer standard in significant ways. The new standard will make it much easier to establish a joint-employer relationship under the NLRA. Workers formerly excluded from union representation as non-employees could now be considered members of a collective bargaining unit with legal rights to negotiate terms and conditions of their employment through a union. [Read more →]
August 28, 2015 No Comments
If you are a federal contractor subject to Section 503, then you are aware of the new regulations that were released in September 2013. While those regulations were released nearly two years ago, the most burdensome of these requirements (implementation of the Subpart C requirements) have not yet been implemented by most contractors because of the transition year period that allowed contractors to delay compliance with Subpart C. As contractors have been permitted to delay compliance, we have seen virtually no enforcement from OFCCP of the Subpart C requirements in audits. That is all about to change.
Contractors are now or will soon be developing their first affirmative action plans that will be subject to the Subpart C requirements. The OFCCP appears to be gearing up to enforce these requirements, as it released this week a Checklist for Compliance with Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Contractors should review the checklist. However, we would not recommend filling it out unless you are doing so in a way that your completion of the checklist and communications are protected by the attorney/client privilege! We would not be surprised if this Checklist becomes the outline that the OFCCP uses to evaluate your company’s compliance with Section 503 during its next audit.
August 13, 2015 No Comments
Managing interpersonal conflict in the workplace is always a delicate and time-consuming duty for managers and Human Resources personnel. But what happens when an employee claims that he or she suffers from a disability due to stress from working with a specific manager or supervisor? Must the employer accommodate the alleged disability by transferring the employee (or the supervisor!) to another role within the company? According to a recent opinion from the California Court of Appeals, Higgins-Williams v. Sutter Medical Foundation, 237 Cal. App. 4th 78 (3d Dist. 2015), the answer is No.
Michaelin Higgins-Williams was a clinical assistant at Sutter Medical Foundation. Initially hired in 2007, in June 2010 Higgins-Williams reported to her treating physician that she was experiencing stress because of interactions with her manager and with human resources. Her physician diagnosed her as having adjustment disorder with anxiety and Higgins-Williams was granted a stress-related disability leave of absence from work under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) and the federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). At the expiration of her entitlement to leave under each act, Higgins-Williams returned to work and received a negative performance review. Following this review, Higgins-Williams claimed that she was being singled out for negative treatment and, after a September 2010 encounter in which her supervisor grabbed her arm, Higgins-Williams had a panic attack, left work and did not return.
Following these events, Higgins-Williams requested a leave of absence, which her employer granted. After an additional leave of absence that extended into January 2011, her treating physician stated that she could not return to work until March 2011 and then only on light duty. Sutter Medical Foundation requested additional information from Higgins-Williams and informed her that if she did not comply with the request, her employment would be terminated on February 1, 2011. Higgins-Williams responded that she did not feel she could return to work on February 1 but that she would try to return on March 1 instead. Sutter terminated Higgins-Williams’ employment as of February 1, 2011.
Higgins-Williams filed suit, claiming that Sutter violated the California Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA) by discriminating against a person with a disability, failing to engage in the interactive process and failing to make reasonable accommodations, retaliating against her on the basis of her disability, and wrongfully terminating her on the basis of her disability. The trial court granted Sutter’s motion for summary judgment on each claim, holding that Higgins-Williams failed to demonstrate that she suffered from a mental disability as defined by FEHA.
On appeal, the court upheld the trial court’s decision and held that an employee’s inability to work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress related to the supervisor’s oversight of the employee’s job performance did not constitute a disability under FEHA. Citing Hobson v. Raychem Corp., 73 Cal. App. 4th 614 (1st Dist. 1999), another Court of Appeals decision in which an employee’s inability to work under a specific supervisor was found not to qualify as a disability under FEHA, the court of appeals stated that Higgins-Williams’ purported disability was the “inability … to work under a particular supervisor” that Hobson held was not a disability under FEHA. Because she was unable to demonstrate the existence of a disability under FEHA, her claims for discrimination, retaliation and wrongful termination based on that “disability” all failed.
While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to managing interpersonal conflict or requests for accommodation, this case provides useful guidance for employers struggling to determine just what constitutes a disability and how to conduct the interactive process required when an employee requests an accommodation based on an alleged disability.
August 13, 2015 No Comments
Mark your calendar and plan to join us for the July 16th HR Steps to Success program. The first program in our series will tackle the Fundamentals of Employee Discipline and discuss the ins and outs of properly disciplining employees. The presentation will cover the following topics:
- Communicating disciplinary procedures
- Understanding HR, supervisor & employee roles
- Developing action plans and remediation techniques
- Improving employee performance
- And more!
The program has been approved for 1 hour of general recertification credit by the HRCI. To RSVP for this program, please contact email@example.com.
July 7, 2015 No Comments
After months of anticipation and many rumors about when the U.S. Department of Labor would release new proposed rules on which employees are eligible for overtime pay, the day has finally arrived. After a speech on the topic by President Obama the night before, the DOL publically announced on the morning of June 30th its proposed regulations, thereby starting the process necessary for the regulations to take effect. HR pros need to understand these new proposed regulations, but also the timeline they will be on before they can have the force of law.
Currently, the salary threshold for a “white collar” employee (a bona fide executive, administrative or professional) to be exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) overtime requirement is $455 a week ($23,660 a year). That figure was last revised more than a decade ago in 2004. The new proposed rule would more than double that minimum salary amount to an estimated $970 a week ($50,440 a year). Employers are required to pay non-exempt employees overtime (a rate not less than one and one-half times the worker’s regular rate of pay) when they work more than 40 hours in a workweek.
The proposed regulations would also put in place a method for updating the salary level – it would be pegged to the 40th percentile of weekly earnings for full-time salaried workers. So the amount would change rather than be static (requiring new DOL regulations to be increased, as has historically been the case). The DOL estimates that the 2016 level will be approximately $970 per week, but no estimate is offered for future years.
Another notable change proposed by the new rules is an increase in the total annual compensation requirement needed to exempt workers that the FLSA defines as “highly compensated employees.” The proposed rules would increase this amount from a fixed minimum of $100,000 per year to a changing amount based on the 90th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time salaried workers (estimated to be $122,148 a year in 2016).
Notably, while the proposed rules would dramatically change these salary thresholds, the DOL is not making specific proposals to modify the standard duties tests also required to be met for an employee to be exempt from the FLSA. But, the DOL is seeking comment on whether those tests “are working as intended to screen out employees who are not bona fide white collar exempt employees.” Undoubtedly, employee-aligned stakeholders will push for tougher or more limiting tests on who meets those exemptions.
While these changes are big – the DOL estimates that the proposed rules would make nearly 5 million more white-collar workers eligible for overtime pay within the first year alone – they do not take effect immediately (as the Robert Frost-inspired title to this post suggests). Rather, once these proposed rules are published in the Federal Register (which should happen soon), there will be a required period for public comment before the DOL can issue final regulations (either making changes based on those comments or not) that employers will then have to follow. That process, plus possible court challenges, will likely keep any new rules from going into effect until sometime in 2016.
Nonetheless, it makes sense for employers to start thinking about these salary numbers and types of employees that will see either significant pay increases to stay exempt, or will become non-exempt and therefore entitled to overtime. Job duties and salary levels of exempt employees should be carefully reviewed, and plans – and budgets – should be assessed now, rather than only after these rules take effect. The DOL has posted a fact sheet explaining the proposed rules which, along with contacting your trusted attorney, is a good place to start.
July 1, 2015 No Comments
More than a year ago we wrote about the intersection of state laws permitting certain medicinal and recreational use of marijuana and employers’ lawful ability to enforce policies prohibiting drug use. (A Hazy Area of the Law: The Impact of Medicinal and Recreational Marijuana Laws on Employers.) At that time, we noted that a Colorado Court of Appeals’ ruling strengthened the position that an employer can lawfully terminate an employee for using medicinal marijuana in violation of its drug policies, even if the employee was not impaired at work and did not use marijuana while at the worksite or during work hours. The Colorado Supreme Court recently confirmed that proposition, giving employers a big sigh of relief.
In that case, Brandon Coats, a telephone customer service representative with a satellite communications company, tested positive for marijuana during a random drug screening, and his employer fired him for violating the company’s drug policy. Coats, a registered medical marijuana patient in Colorado, used the drug while at home to treat painful muscle spasms caused by his quadriplegia.
After his termination, Coats sued, alleging that his firing violated Colorado’s “lawful activities statute” by discharging him due to his state-licensed use of medical marijuana at home during nonworking hours. Coats argued that Colorado’s Medical Marijuana Amendment made such use “lawful” under the state’s lawful activities statute. The trial court dismissed Coats’s complaint after finding that medical marijuana use is not “lawful” under that statute. In 2013, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Colorado Supreme Court recently affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. It noted that the term “lawful” was general and not restricted in any way. The court declined “to engraft a state law limitation onto the term” by holding the term “lawful” means activities that are “permitted by law” and those that are “not contrary to, or forbidden by law.” Consequently, the court concluded that any activity that is unlawful under either federal law or state law cannot be “lawful” under Colorado’s lawful activities statute. The court declined to address whether medical marijuana use is lawful under Colorado’s Medical Marijuana Amendment because the behavior was unquestionably unlawful under federal law.
As we suggested in our earlier article, this ruling further strengthens an employer’s right to discipline or terminate an employee for violating the company’s drug policy, even if that employee was not under the influence while at work and did not consume illegal drugs during work hours. Colorado companies can continue to enforce drug policies that prohibit the use of marijuana because both the medicinal use and recreational use of the drug are prohibited under federal law. Employers outside of Colorado should continue monitoring judicial decisions interpreting medicinal and recreational marijuana laws as they quite likely become law in other states.
June 30, 2015 No Comments
The U.S. Supreme Court has today upheld another challenged provision of the Affordable Care Act, this time related to government subsidies. We’ve gathered some of the top news articles on the decision:
- Supreme Court Allows Nationwide Health Care Subsidies, New York Times
- Supreme Court Upholds Obama’s Health-Law Subsidies, Wall Street Journal
- Breaking: Supreme Court Hands Obama Another Victory on ACA, Law360
Of course, there will be more legal analysis to come. But clearly, as a result of the decision, employers will still have to continue navigating the many challenges presented by the ACA.
Watch for more details and analysis about the Supreme Court’s decision posted here soon.
June 25, 2015 No Comments
“Good” and “Bad” Employee Handbook Rules in Light of Increasing Section 7 Violations: The NLRB GC’s Report
Earlier this year, on March 18, 2015, NLRB General Counsel Richard F. Griffin, Jr. issued a report covering recent cases on employee handbook rules that encroached on employees’ Section 7 rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Griffin’s report (GC Memo 15-04) stated that the vast majority of handbook violations are due to employers’ failure to comply with the first prong of the Lutheran Heritage test. The report also provides timely guidance to employers in light of a recent NLRB decision against a fast-food restaurant’s finding Section 7 violations in its employee handbook.
This post will begin by introducing the Lutheran Heritage test and this and following posts will discuss examples of lawful and unlawful handbook rules from Griffin’s report. Future posts will use the Lutheran Heritage test to examine the violations found in that fast-food restaurant’s employee handbook and how the unlawful rules were revised pursuant to a settlement agreement. Finally, additional posts will discuss best practices for employers to ensure employees’ Section 7 rights remain protected.
The Lutheran Heritage Test
The Lutheran Heritage test originated from Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004), a case that came before the NLRB when an employer’s work rules were challenged on the grounds that they chilled employees’ exercise of Section 7 activity (i.e., “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” as well as the right “to refrain from any or all such activities”). The Board held that when an employer’s rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Section 7, it will still be deemed unlawful if “(1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.” Griffin’s report focuses on the first prong of this test.
Rules Regarding Confidentiality
Employers have an interest in protecting confidential company information. However, employers must be careful not to create an overbroad restriction against sharing company information that may lead employees to reasonably believe that their Section 7 activity is being prohibited. An employer’s policy that “either specifically prohibits employee discussions of terms and conditions of employment – such as wages, hours, or workplace complaints – or that employees would reasonably understand to prohibit such discussions, violates the Act.” See Flamingo-Hilton Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287, 288 n.3, 291-92 (1999). Also, a rule that is broad enough to encompass “employee” or “personnel” information without sufficient clarification would be considered unlawful. For instance, restricting employees from disclosing information about other associates that was “obtained in violation of law or lawful Company policy” is too overbroad because a reasonable employee would not know what constitutes a “lawful Company policy.”
Below are some examples of unlawfully overbroad provisions:
- Prohibiting employees from “[d]isclosing…details about the [Employer].”
- Prohibiting the “sharing of [overheard conversations at the work site] with your co-workers, the public, or anyone outside of your immediate work group.”
- Requiring that employees “discuss work matters only with other employees who have a specific business reason to know or have access to such information….” and “not discuss work matters in public places.”
- Instructing employees that “if something is not public information, you must not share it.”
In contrast, the following provisions were found to be facially lawful because the definition of “confidential information” was not overbroad, there was no language to otherwise restrict Section 7 communications, and there was no reference to employee terms and conditions of employment:
- No unauthorized disclosure of “business ‘secrets’ or other confidential information.”
- “Misuse or unauthorized disclosure of confidential information not otherwise available to persons or firms outside [Employer] is cause for disciplinary action, including termination.”
- “Do not disclose confidential financial data, or other non-public proprietary company information. Do not share confidential information regarding business partners, vendors or customers.”
Clearly, employer rules involving confidentiality require careful attention to detail as the NLRB’s decisions on these cases are often very fact-specific. Savvy employers will be sure to vet their confidentiality requirements with legal counsel to make sure they do not run afoul of the NLRB’s cases described in Griffin’s report.
Our next post on the report will cover rules regarding: (i) employee conduct towards the Company and supervisors, (ii) employee conduct towards fellow employees, and (iii) employee interaction with third-parties.
June 24, 2015 No Comments
Distinguishing “Motive” and “Knowledge” – The Supreme Court’s Decision In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Adds New Considerations To The Hiring Process
Last week the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) won what has become known as the “headscarf case” before the U.S. Supreme Court. The case, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, deals with provisions of Title VII that make it illegal for an employer to refuse to hire a job applicant just to avoid accommodating a religious practice. The decision expands Title VII liability to instances where a job applicant has not informed the employer of a need for an accommodation―a novel concept to many employers.
In Abercrombie, the EEOC brought suit on behalf of Samantha Elauf claiming that the company violated Title VII by not hiring her. At the time, Abercrombie had a “look policy” that governed employees’ attire and prohibited employees from wearing “caps.” Elauf is a Muslim teenager who wears a headscarf as a part of her religious practice. She wore the headscarf to her interview at Abercrombie. The company suspected (but did not confirm) that Elauf wore the headscarf due to her religious beliefs. Yet, Elauf was not hired because her headscarf violated the “look policy.”
The EEOC prevailed in the district court, receiving money damages for Elauf. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that an employer does not violate Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination unless management actually knows that a job applicant needs an exception from a work rule due to a religious practice. The EEOC appealed arguing that Title VII contained no such knowledge requirement.
At the Supreme Court, Abercrombie argued that unless the applicant told the interviewers that she intended to wear a headscarf for religious reasons she could not sue for failing to accommodate that religious practice. In essence, Abercrombie sought to put the burden on the applicant to tell the employer of the need for an accommodation. This argument was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in concluding that Title VII does not include a burden-shifting test that would put the burden on plaintiffs to seek a religious accommodation. Even more, the Supreme Court explained that unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII includes no requirement that an employer have actual knowledge of the reason for an applicant’s need for an accommodation.
But how can an employer intentionally discriminate without knowledge of the need for a religious accommodation? The Supreme Court explained that “motive and knowledge are separate concepts.” Intentional discrimination prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge. Thus, an applicant need show only that her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer actually knew of her need. So, “an employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.”
The question not squarely answered by the Supreme Court is whether an employer’s motive to avoid accommodating a religious practice requires knowledge that the practice is religious in nature. While the majority stated that it is “arguable” that the motive requirement is not met unless the employer at least suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice, the Court left this question for another day because Abercrombie knew―or at least suspected―that the scarf was worn for religious reasons.
Following this decision, employers may be tempted to ask explicitly whether an accommodation is based on a religious belief or if a candidate ascribes to a particular faith. Of course, it is risky to ask any questions about someone’s protected characteristics during a job interview. So this decision creates a difficult situation where an employer risks suit for both asking and not asking certain questions. Regardless, employers now know that an applicant does not have to explicitly put the employer on notice of his or her religious practice to set forth a Title VII claim. Employers should therefore be on high alert when they know or suspect that something is being worn for religious reasons. Moreover, an employer who has a reason to believe or suspect that accommodation may be necessary (regardless of the source) will need to consider engaging in an interactive process over the possible accommodation with the applicant.
June 10, 2015 No Comments
California employers have long been aware that California state law prohibits inclusion of non-compete clauses in standard employment agreements. But, in a first of its kind case, a divided federal appeals court panel has interpreted California Business and Professions Code Section 16600 to also bar “no-employment” contract terms that prevent a former employee from working for the former employer or any entity in contract with the former employer. The court held that this type of provision limits an employee’s ability to work in contravention of the terms of Section 16600.
In Golden v. California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, et al., a majority opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (which covers California) reasoned that Section 16600 is not limited solely to traditional non-compete agreements but instead covers any employment agreement that restrains people from engaging in a lawful profession, trade or business. At issue in the case was a settlement agreement between an emergency room physician and his former employer that contained a provision that waived the doctor’s rights to employment with the medical practice or at any facility that the practice may own or with which it may contract in the future. When the doctor refused to execute the written agreement, his attorney sought to enforce the agreement against him and the trial court held that Business and Professions Code § 16600 did not void the settlement agreement as it did not inhibit the doctor from competing with his former employer.
On appeal, the doctor argued that Section 16600 voids the agreement because the no-employment provision may impermissibly restrain his professional practice. The dissent did not agree with that position, noting that such a possibility was at best hypothetical and did not limit his current ability to practice his profession. However, the majority ruled that Section 16600 does not limit itself to non-compete clauses and may apply to this case. In doing so, the court noted that Section 16600 does not use the word “competition” and is written in a very broad manner that contrasts with the later sections that detail specific exemptions to the rule. The court declined to determine whether the contract was actually void; instead, it sent the case back to the trial court for additional fact-finding to determine whether the contract term created a substantial restraint on his professional practice.
California employers who include no-employment provisions in their severance or settlement agreements with former employees should take caution when including such terms and tailor them carefully to avoid challenge under Section 16600. Provisions that allow an employer to terminate employment if a former employee is found to later be employed by a contractor or a company acquired by the employer may be deemed overly restrictive based on this ruling and may result in a void agreement. That is a significantly dangerous result, as other rights created by the agreement regarding the former employee could also be lost to the employer.
April 24, 2015 No Comments